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1. Political Philosophy for a Special Animal
All discourse on, and analysis of, human society has as its prereq-
uisite some concept, simple or complex, of what it is to be a human 
being. Sociology, political theory and political philosophy require an-
thropology. Our understanding of ourselves relates directly to the way 
we wish to live – and to the set-up of our social world. According to 
Plato, for example, the human being is capable of ultimate insight, of 
grasping truth. This human capability can, however, be easily con-
strained by any number of human motives which cloud the perception 
of truth. This is the reason why Plato places education so centrally in 
the constitution of his polis. He recommends, among other things, that 
the citizens of the polis should grow up without knowing their own 
families (their parents and siblings). According to Plato, strong famili-
al bonds lead people to think of their own particular interests as more 
important than the public good. Two thousand years later, Thomas 
Hobbes can characterize human beings by their fear of death. In 
Hobbes’ analysis, a powerful state, governed by a powerful leader, is 
the only thing which will grant the sense of security necessary for the 
cohesion of a society of human beings. Therefore it is, according to 
Hobbes, in everyone’s self-interest to subordinate one’s own needs to 
the needs of the state. Rousseau, by contrast, holds the opposite opin-
ion. He sees a strong relationship between misanthropy and an almost 
unlimited confidence in human nature: “Men are evil – melancholy 
and continuous experience removes the need for proof. However, man 
is naturally good.”1 For Rousseau social constraints are the primary 
source of the corruption of human nature. These constraints, he 
1 Rousseau 1755. 
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claims, are the cause of human hatreds and “all imaginable bad 
things.”2 
Despite differences of detail, all the above thinkers have one thing in 
common: they assume that taking the natural state of the human being 
as fundamental to socio-political order will result in the greatest good. 
Given this, Political Philosophy has the task of understanding how hu-
man beings naturally behave. Furthermore, politics must seek ways of 
controlling and moderating the unsocial aspects of human nature, and 
of encouraging and promoting the social. 
There was a fundamental change in the methodology of Political Phi-
losophy at the end of the twentieth century. From then until now two 
opposed interpretations of the interrelation between politics and anthro-
pology have co-existed:  
 
1) The social sciences have freed themselves almost completely from 
the idea that there is a basic nature common to all human beings. Af-
ter the “cultural turn” within these disciplines, they took it for grant-
ed that immediate access to facts is methodologically impossible, in-
cluding facts about the purported nature of human beings. Scientific 
theories are understood as a kind of “symbolic orders which have 
been produced by social processes and lead to ultimately contingent 
interpretations.”3 These systems of orders do not explain human na-
ture. Social scientists use them instead to construct a picture of the 
human being as a construction from nothing. One well-known ex-
ample of such use is that of Judith Butler. According to her, both our 
gender and our sexual identity are – like any other binary system re-
lating to the dichotomy between male and female – merely a cultural 
construct without any biological foundation.4 One might speak here 
of “culturalism.”5 Culturalism is an idea common to such diverse 
approaches as gender studies, structuralism, Foucaultian discourse 
analysis, deconstructivism, and constructivism. It presupposes that 
there is no immediate access to knowledge of human nature, and 
                                                 
2 Ibid.  
3 Cf. Reckwitz 2006, 24.  
4 Butler 1993. 
5 See the pointedly illustration in Fischer 2005. 
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that all so called “insights” regarding human nature are merely cul-
tural products. According to these approaches, any claim to a defini-
tive analysis of human nature is naive and must therefore be refuted. 
This has important consequences for the interpretation of biology as 
a natural science: According to culturalism, biology creates its own 
subject — biology only remains a “discourse of power which creates 
an illusion of objectivity, but which inheres its own contingency.” 
 
2) On the other hand, one might choose to understand the twentieth 
century as a triumphal procession of evolutionary sciences. These 
disciplines unquestionably shed light on the biological species homo 
sapiens. After Darwin had cleared the way for evolution-oriented be-
havioural research (on the model of anatomical and morphological 
research) it was common to use evolutionary models to account for 
the ways we behave, feel, and even think. Classical ethology, and later 
socio-biology and, even more recently, evolutionary psychology to-
gether came to new insights and made the bold claim that nature 
puts a short leash on the human being, that is, that the scope of pos-
sible behaviours is narrowed severely through evolutionary pathways. 
 
As a consequence of these two different approaches, political theory 
and evolutionary sciences became alienated from one another. One the 
one hand, every reference to “human nature” is vehemently rejected by 
political theorists. As Clifford Geertz puts it: “There is no human nature 
apart from culture.”6 This slogan had also a political dimension: Refer-
ence to nature was seen as a move by reactionary conservatives to justify 
inequality and to undermine emancipatory freedoms.7 On the other 
                                                 
6 Geertz 1973, 35.  
7 Obviously, political dimensions are more complex. European conservatives often used 
recent results of behavioural biology to show invariable human properties and a constant 
social behaviour. But in the United States, the majority of conservatives refused Darwin-
ism since it threatened their religious beliefs. “Many conservatives, it seems, find the Dar-
winian account of human nature at best useless and at worst pernicious” (cf. Holloway 
2006, 7). However, in recent years, there were many conservative theorists in the U.S. re-
ferring to Darwin, whereas European socialists nowadays do not shy away from evolution-
ary arguments neither. 
Christian Illies 
 
154 
hand, evolutionary scientists point to a growing loss of reality within the 
(culturalistic) social sciences. For natural scientists it is problematic that 
socially relevant disciplines still do not acknowledge the results of empir-
ical research. Some scientists even claim that social sciences should be 
re-constituted on evolutionary grounds. As Robert Trivers suggests, dis-
ciplines such as “political sciences, law, economics, psychology, and an-
thropology” should all become “branches of sociobiology.”8 
In the following, I will defend neither of the two extreme positions 
but will look for possibilities of updating the traditional synthetic view 
that is based upon an interrelation of natural and political sciences. To 
do so, I will focus on two questions: 
 
- What do evolutionary sciences tell us about human beings and about 
the development of culture? 
- What practical consequences can we draw from this for political phi-
losophy? (How can, for example, we make use of the knowledge of 
biological anthropology and evolutionary theory when conceiving 
prudent political structures and institutions?) 
 
The first question will be discussed in the following section (Section 
2) in which a thumb-nail sketch of the human being as interpreted by 
biology will be presented. After that, the consequences of this picture for 
political philosophy will be investigated (Section 3). 
 
 
2. Human Nature and Culture Seen from an Evolutionary Perspective 
 
2.1 The Human Being as a Creature of Possibilities 
 
What can we learn about the nature of human beings from biology 
and evolutionary theory?9 “Seeing a dog, a horse and a man yawn, 
makes me feel how much all animals are built on one structure,”10 wrote 
                                                 
8 Quoted from the German newspaper Die Zeit (Dossier Soziobiologie), July 29, 1978, 33.  
9 For a more detailed answer to this question, see Illies 2006, 120-155. 
10 Darwin 1838. 
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Darwin into his diary in 1838. In 1859, in his On the Origin of Species, he 
made only a few vague comments about human beings. But the evolu-
tionary perspective obviously gives a new foundation for (biological) an-
thropology, and thus it is no surprise that a few years after the publica-
tion of the Origin, other authors came up with evolutionary histories of 
the human animal: Thomas Henry Huxley, Ludwig Büchner, and Ernst 
Haeckel being but three examples.11 Darwin wrote his own anthropology 
later: The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex was published in 
1871, and The Expressions of Emotion in Man and Animal in 1872. His 
method was to compare observations of human and animal behaviour.12 
He found, for example, similarities in the expression of fear and sub-
mission. In both works Darwin raises topics which are still points of de-
bate today. All of them share the premise that there exist biologically se-
lected dispositions within human behaviour: for emotions and even for 
cognitive acts.  
Evolutionary biology has, in the last century, been honed by correct-
ing two points within Darwin’s theory. Firstly, biologists discovered the 
mechanism of heredity (about which Darwin had no developed theory). 
Secondly, not the species but the gene is now seen as the fundamental 
unit of selection. A property is selected because it gives a certain indi-
vidual (plant or animal) advantages over its fellows of the same species. 
This is the only way the property can be distributed within a certain 
population. As a consequence, selection primarily takes place between 
genes which encode certain properties. Selection on the level of a group 
or species is second-order.13  
This does not change the validity of Darwin’s basic assumptions, 
which are still accepted by the majority of evolutionary biologists. Hu-
man beings naturally have dispositions: emotions and ways of behaving 
and thinking. They were useful at a certain stage in our evolutionary his-
tory – for example in the age of hunter-gatherers – and therefore they 
have been positively selected (first for an individual and later for the 
whole species). We assume that these dispositions can be found in all 
                                                 
11 Huxley 1873; Büchner 1869; Haeckel 1875. 
12For Darwin’s methodology, see Hösle and Illies 1999, 85 ff. 
13 For the possibility of group selection, Wilson 1995, Sober 2000. Vehement defenders of 
group selection of the human are Robert Boyd and Peter J. Richardson (1988). 
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human beings: they are part of the “genetic core” of the species. Even if 
they are always integrated into culture, their generality does not allow for 
an explanation in purely cultural terms (at least, according to evolution-
ary biologists). This does not mean that these dispositions are found 
equally pronounced in every single human being or that they always 
cause identical behaviour. Behaviour varies from case to case and de-
pends also on the socio-cultural environment in which the life of an in-
dividual develops. 
But which of these results are important for political theory? We can 
distinguish four areas, even if only roughly. We shall call the first area 
elementary life requirements. These requirements human beings and most 
animals have in common: we (as all animals) must eat and drink, be ac-
tive and sleep, and reproduce. In addition, there are three groups of 
phenomena which, we would argue, have a genetic foundation: disposi-
tions towards sociability (cooperation, strategic alliances, altruism etc.), 
dispositions towards unsociability (aggression, defence against strangers, 
social ambition etc.) and dispositional beliefs, thoughts, and emotions. Jona-
than Haidt calls these emotions “moral emotions” since they either sup-
port social behaviour (including altruistic behaviour) or punish anti-
social behaviour.14 David Buss gives a more precise account which cate-
gorizes these feelings in to three groups, namely “respect for authority,” 
“a thirst for justice,” and “the evolution of care.”15 The last area is espe-
cially interesting since it not only touches on the socio-political, but also 
includes phenomena that seem to be over and above pure emotions. 
These include certain inborn patterns of thought, mainly relating to so-
cial crises which the individual experiences when dealing with other in-
dividuals, which might well be part of our genetic heritage. Leda Cos-
mides and John Tooby claim that we naturally think in categories of “so-
cial contract.”16 
It is likely that there are also genetic dispositions to normative struc-
tures – behavioural rules, norms, and values. Edward O. Wilson argues, 
along these same lines: “Precepts chosen by intuition based on emotion 
                                                 
14 Haidt 2001 and 2003. 
15 Buss 2004, 388. 
16 Cosmides and Tooby 1992; see also Cosmides 1989. 
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are primarily biological in origin and are likely to do no more than rein-
force the primitive social arrangements. Such a morality is unconscious-
ly shaped to give new rationalizations for the consecration of the group, 
the proselytizing role of altruism, and the defence of territory.”17 
A whole range of social behaviour seems to be determined (or at least 
influenced) by natural dispositions. This, at the least, is what biological 
anthropology can tell us about human nature. This does not contradict 
the fact that the human being needs a cultural community for his full 
development. The human being is not able to flourish completely by vir-
tue of these innate dispositions alone: without a cultural community, his 
dispositions cannot be manifested. Furthermore, specific cultural 
frameworks play decisive roles when it comes to the question of how 
these dispositions are to be developed. What, for example, does social 
standing mean? How does one attain to it in, for example, wrestling, 
singing, or a successful professional career? What status symbols mark 
it? These questions cannot be answered with reference purely to disposi-
tion alone: specific social settings determine the expression of the dispo-
sition. “The dispositions influence the development of human behaviour 
rather by suggestions than by prescriptions” – as Hubert Markl puts it.18 
From a biological point of view, the human being is primarily a creature 
of possibilities placed within a range of behaviour where the range is bio-
logically bounded but the behaviours are culturally affected. 
 
 
2.2 Problems in Biological Anthropology 
 
There is much to support Darwin’s idea that the evolutionary history 
of Homo sapiens also includes behavioural dispositions. The literature of 
the last few decades adduces many examples of human beings display-
ing strong regularities and culturally independent patterns of behaving, 
feeling, or thinking; and there are various explanations of their selective 
advantages. But what does this tell us? How can this rule out the possi-
bility that a regularity – even if it occurs in all human beings – is solely a 
                                                 
17 Wilson 1978, 167.  
18 Markl 1986, 86. 
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cultural regularity? Statistical methods can make genetic-disposition 
claims plausible, but can never prove them.19 One would need as a con-
trol group a number of individuals who grew up without any cultural 
framework; but such persons do not exist, and such a comparison is 
therefore impossible. Human development decisively relies on interac-
tions with other human beings. Furthermore, most dispositions in 
which political philosophy is interested relate to social action, i.e. behav-
iours enacted within a cultural framework (even if this framework may 
be minimal). It is a methodological precondition that our actions are in-
terwoven within a socio-cultural framework.20 
The analogy adduced by Darwin does not help here. Similar behaviour 
in animals and human beings can never be enough to give a positive proof 
of the existence of any disposition. For such a proof, one would need to 
show how certain genes encode proteins which build up a certain brain 
structure and thereby cause certain behaviours. At present no one can say 
when or whether biology will be able to demonstrate such details. 
Perhaps such a positive proof will never be forthcoming. Many critics 
assume that human culture developed in so a short time that genetic se-
lection of relevant dispositions was impossible.21 Also most dispositions 
(if they exist at all) are inherited poly-genetically, and this would make 
the whole concept of rival genes inapplicable. There is also the objection 
that many explanations for selective advantages are mere speculations 
and do not help in the understanding of the phenomena.22 
There is much biology would have to do in order to come up with a 
positive proof of genetic dispositions. One of the first steps biology 
                                                 
19 For an overview of objections against biological anthropology, see Kleeberg and Walter 2001. 
20 However, one might try to observe the interaction between “natural” humans (i.e. humans 
growing up without any cultural frame), since such humans could not learn anything from 
anyone. But even this would not be enough for a proof in the strict sense: Firstly, most behav-
ioural patterns which are genetically disposed require a minimal ability of communication, 
and language can only be acquired within a cultural frame. Secondly, even the observation of 
“natural” humans does not methodically exclude the possibility that they might learn a cer-
tain behaviour, if only during process in which they are observed. 
21 For example Kleeberg and Walter 2001, 51 f. But for the opposite opinion, see Lorenz 1974. 
22 Many critics say that sociobiology often re-describes already-known social phenomena 
with evolutionary terminology, but do not add anything to our understanding. Even Mi-
chael Ruse claims this rather snappishly in Philosophy of Biology Today, 1988, 66 ff. 
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would have to take is to articulate what actually might be grounded ge-
netically. What does it mean to have a “disposition?” What exactly are we 
claiming if we, for example, assume that human beings are nepotistic or 
reciprocal altruists by nature? Obviously this should mean that humans 
behave in certain situations in a particular way (which needs to be 
demonstrated by statistically significant evidence) and that the cause of 
this particular behaviour lies (at least partially) in biological structures. 
But actions are not properties like hair colour or the ability to roll the 
tongue. Actions are always the result of complex factors and procedures. 
Emotions may well have an important role in triggering action. Mark 
Ridley describes emotions as mediators between an inner calculator and 
outer behaviour.23 A disposition for altruism would then mean that we 
naturally have certain emotions, such as sympathy, which lead us into 
particular sets of relationships (for example, when a relative is in need) 
which lead to altruistic actions. But this cannot be enough; when human 
beings act, the behaviour is not determined; for then it would not be an 
act. A person who feels vertigo when looking down from a great height, 
will shy away from a precipice in fear. This is not an act. When we act, 
we are not simply determined by an emotion – we decide to behave in a 
certain way (at least, that is what most of us believe). That is the reason 
why early ethologists stressed that human behaviour is not entirely con-
trolled by instincts (as they believed the behaviour of other animals was), 
but rather that human beings can and must always make decisions. 
Even if emotions mediate between the inner calculator and behaviour, 
one would need to clarify the complex role of reflection (or of the human 
will). One might agree with Steven Pinker when he claims that the ex-
pressions ‘kin-directed’ and ‘reciprocal altruism’ (and we might add: the 
dispositions towards them) are a “behaviourist short-hand for a set of 
thoughts and emotions”.24 But we also need to clarify what is meant by 
those “thoughts.” 
This whole interrelation is barely understood — and as long as there 
are no plausible theories purporting to explain it, all theories of natural 
behavioural dispositions remain incomplete. This general problem is 
                                                 
23 Ridley 1996, 193. 
24 Pinker 1999, 403, my emphasis. 
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brought to the fore by various attempts to supply a conceptual analysis of 
“dispositions” which would make the explanandum more precise. What 
is it that could be genetically determined? Konrad Lorenz speaks about 
“inherited coordinates” (Erbkoordinaten) or “instincts.” Recent ethol-
ogists speak instead of “innate behaviour.” Edward O. Wilson postulates 
natural “epigenetic rules,”25 and other evolutionary biologists rather 
vaguely claim that there are “internal desires, emotions and lustful-
ness.”26 
Should these considerable problems lead us to the conclusion that 
political theory should take the possibility of genetic behaviour disposi-
tions with a pinch of salt? No. The hypothesis that such dispositions ex-
ist is still a plausible explanation for the fact that certain behaviour and 
phenomena are culturally invariant. This holds even though there is no 
positive proof of such genetic disposition and all such dispositional the-
ory needs to be spelled out more precisely. The hypothesis is plausible 
for two reasons. Firstly, it is consistent with many other insights in evo-
lutionary biology and in other related disciplines (such as neurobiology). 
Secondly, we do not have any other plausible explanation. If – as many 
contemporary political theorists argue – statistically significantly behav-
ioural patterns were merely cultural phenomena, it is rather puzzling as to 
why they occur within all or very many cultures.27 It is therefore, I be-
lieve, fruitful to pursue my initial question concerning the ramifications 
of the evolutionary sciences on the notion of human nature, even if the 
results of these sciences must still be regarded as speculations. 
 
 
2.3 Anthropological Foundations of Socio-Cultural Phenomena 
 
Thus far my analysis has been limited to the individual human being 
and the biological determination of her actions. But many see this limi-
tation as a conceptual barrier when asking why a biologically-determined 
human being gives her actions certain social forms and creates (or plays 
                                                 
25 See Lumsden and Wilson 1980. 
26 Hubert Markl, quoted by Voland 1999. 
27 One exception may be the — even less plausible — thesis that the human is completely 
free and there are no explanations for frequent behavioural patterns at all. 
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her part in creating) institutions controlling her own behaviour. (‘Insti-
tution,’ in this context, means a system of rules creating a certain social 
ordering. Institutions can be either formal or informal.) Unlike behav-
ioural biologists, who analyse the genetically-determined realm of possi-
bilities, I wish to investigate why human beings order their realm of 
possibilities in such a way as to create their socio-cultural worlds. 
Arnold Gehlen was one of the first philosophers to arrive at such an 
analysis. His starting point is the human being as a biological creature, 
but he arrives at a social philosophy and a theory of institutions. He does 
not, however, begin with the rich biological realm of possibilities, but 
rather focuses on the shortcomings and limits of human nature. He de-
scribes the human being as an “undetermined animal” (referring to a 
formulation by Nietzsche). This “undetermined animal” has many 
shortcomings, since there are no controlling instincts or stable behav-
ioural patterns in its nature. Even though his analysis is in many ways 
outdated (as demonstrated above) it is still worth taking a look on Geh-
len’s explanation of complex social structures. According to Gehlen, so-
cial institutions compensate for the shortcomings of natural instincts. 
They unburden the human being by giving him stability and control of 
his actions. Gehlen distinguishes three ways in which the socio-cultural 
world (first and foremost the institutions) is influenced and affected by 
natural human dispositions: 
(i) The lack of other behavioural controls makes it necessary for human 
beings to create unburdening institutions. 
(ii) Even if dispositions do not entirely control the human being, these 
instincts still guide her actions in general directions (for example, to-
wards ingestion). Institutions are to be understood as “forms of over-
coming life-important tasks or circumstances,” since, for example, “re-
production or defence or ingestion require a regulated and continuous 
cooperation.”28 
(iii) Gehlen also claims that institutions arise during a process of devel-
opment. They are not the result of any conscious plan but the result of 
the unplanned action of many individuals. “The living together of hu-
mans is stabilised in forms of orderings and rules, which come into ex-
                                                 
28 Gehlen 1961, 71. 
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istence just by themselves. One has to look for their steering mechanism 
within the area of instincts, but never in the rational calculation of 
ends.”29 
About the process of democratisation, Gehlen claims that this has its 
own dynamic and does not follow any sociological rationale: “The demo-
cratic form of government for example is adopted by many peoples like 
the European way of clothing.”30  
We might present two general objections to Gehlen’s thesis. Firstly, 
his theory of institutions is too neutral as to question of their validity and 
justification. He explains institutions more or less purely functionally in 
terms of a stabilising power. But whether an institution, first and fore-
most the important formal institutions within law and politics, are phil-
osophically legitimated is not an interesting question for Gehlen. Sec-
ondly, Gehlen does not reflect whether and how the individual institu-
tions are involved in a selective competition with one another. He does 
not say whether a non-biological evolution within the socio-cultural 
frame is possible or not. Gehlen does not think in a sufficiently evolu-
tionary way. He considers the functionality of institutions but seems not 
to care about their variation or selection. This is a rather “thin” under-
standing of Darwinism. It is, of course, a very evolutionary way of think-
ing to assume that a phenomenon has an advantageous property. For, 
according to evolutionary theory, properties are functional adaptations 
(at least in general; there are some exceptions, such as the “genetic drift”). 
This is, however, only a conclusion drawn from Darwinism and not a 
central tenet of Darwinism itself. Thirdly, Gehlen’s starting point con-
flicts with the insights of modern evolutionary biology. It is hard to see 
how his assumption, that human beings are deficient (“Mängelwesen”), 
holds when we obviously have highly specialised behavioural disposi-
tions.31 Furthermore, the assumption of deficiency contradicts the logic 
of evolutionary thought. For the human being was – at a certain point in 
time – a successfully selected primate. She must, then, have been well 
                                                 
29 Gehlen 1969, 95. 
30 Gehlen 1964, 91. 
31 Gehlen argues against this that the possibilities human beings have is so-to-say the “flip-
side” of an incomplete being and he is contrasting human imagination with rationality. 
See Gehlen 1940. 
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adapted. (The compensation of physical shortcomings via cultural 
achievement is a phenomenon which occurs much later in history and 
cannot be an explanation for the positive selection of Homo sapiens over 
other hominidae). 
I wish now to focus on some other attempts of relating the biological 
to the socio-cultural. In his studies of ancient religions Walter Burkert 
(1996) raises the question of the biological roots of our symbolic culture 
(religion is a good example of such culture). Like Gehlen, Burkert sees 
religion as a cultural phenomenon which guides human action and 
gives its adherents orientation. It is therefore a functional institution. 
Burkert does not see religion as a compensation for our natural short-
comings, but understands it as a consequence of biological skills. Thus 
he conforms to the widely accepted opinion that human beings have 
many dispositions which allow for a wide range of realisation. 
But what is meant by a disposition towards religion? Burkert claims 
that it is an extension of the cultural framework created by the ability to 
communicate in a language. “Parallel to language, religion too, as an ef-
fective means of most serious communication, can be hypothesized to 
have arisen at a certain stage in prehistory as a competitive act, a way of 
gaining an advantage over those who did not take part in it.”32 That lan-
guage has a biological foundation is not only obvious because of its uni-
versality, it can also be shown by reference to the very special physiologi-
cal apparatus needed for vocalization. According to Burkert, one must 
assume a combined evolution of the biological conditions for language 
and language itself. One cannot separate nature from culture here, since 
language is a so-called hybrid phenomenon in which nature and culture 
are intertwined. Language allowed early human beings not only to 
communicate, but also to create a common linguistic world of meaning 
which gave them guidance and orientation. 
But in what way is religion an adaptation? Although Burkert (1996) 
admits that a detailed explanation of its development and selective ad-
vantages remains part of the inaccessible pre-history of humankind, one 
can make educated guesses as to how religion contributed to evolution-
ary fitness. 
                                                 
32 Burkert 1996, 19. 
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One factor is the orientation religions (and other institutions) provide. 
In a complex environment religions offered categories for interpretation 
which helped to order and structure the natural world. Burkert refers 
here to Niklas Luhmann’s thesis that religion allows for a “reduction of 
complexity,” and adds that religion gives “orientation within a meaning-
ful cosmos for those who feel helpless vis-à-vis infinite complexity.”33 
Religion helps to orientate the individual both in a theoretical and a 
practical way. It offers sense and gives practical solutions to difficult 
problems. Its offers are universal since religion broaches all topics af-
fecting human life: elementary needs (such as hunger and thirst), ele-
mentary actions (such as giving and receiving), special experiences (such 
as death), and emotions (such as fear and happiness). Religion thus 
gives the human being a certain distance from these phenomena. Reli-
gious reference to trans-empirical principles makes it easier to deal with 
difficult situations. According to Burkert, all this contributed to human 
evolutionary fitness. Another factor is the motivating power of religion: it 
can channel and encourage particular behaviours. Rituals encourage 
continuous repetition of certain behaviours.34 Religion motivates by en-
duing reality with transcendental seriousness. It integrates fear and 
hope, and events and actions, into an ordered moral and metaphysical 
scheme.35 
Both Gehlen and Burkert treat institutions as functional features of 
the human being. But Burkert understands the human being from the 
perspective of her dispositions (and possibilities) rather than from the 
perspective of her shortcomings. He also assumes that the human insti-
tutions and the nexus of individuals in community offer a higher evolu-
tionary fitness than that which can be attained by individuals function-
ing alone. He therefore concludes there must have been positive selec-
tion for this combination. Human beings without religious disposition, 
and therefore without its institutional manifestation (as, for example, the 
Neanderthal) appear to have vanished. But Burkert does not address the 
question as to whether there is competition among institutions and 
                                                 
33 Burkert 1996, 26. 
34 Cf. Burkert 1996, 44. 
35 Cf. Burkert 196, 47. 
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therefore a (Darwinian) evolution of institutions.36 His primary goal is to 
demonstrate how culture – and especially religion – builds upon biologi-
cal dispositions and how it reacts to these dispositions.37 
 
 
2.4 The Natural Framework of Cultural Developments  
 
The above authors attempt to connect the socio-cultural and the biologi-
cal using the individual human creature as a starting point. Other authors 
begin by looking at collectives. One can see how some societies and cultures 
are influenced by natural (but non-human) circumstances: by, for example, 
the characteristics of a landscape, the climate, or the local flora and fauna of 
a region. Such observation has been used in political philosophy, in Mon-
tesquieu’s De L’Esprit des Lois (1748). He sees, for example, a connection be-
tween the climate of a region and its legal system. However, his specula-
tions remain largely unjustified. The same is true of Ellsworth Hunning-
ton’s attempts in Climate and Civilisation (1915), in which he proposes maps 
of “climatic energy” which lead to certain cultural developments. 
Jared Diamond’s arguments are more convincing. By reference to 
certain environmental parameters he explains evolutionary scenarios ac-
cording to which the members of a tribe either died out, became hunters 
and gatherers, or created complexly organised states.38 In Guns, Germs 
and Steel. The Fate of Human Societies (1997), he identifies four natural 
factors which have played a decisive role in the development of human 
cultures over the last 13,000 years. 
1) He points us to the richness of regions with wild plants and animals 
which could be domesticated. Only where there is enough richness of this 
kind, is there the possibility of agriculture. Agriculture and the nutrition 
surplus which is allows enable both the specialisation of professions (there 
can be non-agricultural professions) and the growth of population.39 
                                                 
36 He distinguishes bigger developmental steps, for example from a primarily oral towards 
a written culture and religion. See Burkert 1996, 214 ff. But he does not say whether this 
has to be seen as an evolutionary process of selection. 
37 Cf. Burkert 1996, 36. 
38 Diamond 1997, 501 f.  
39 Diamond 1997 , 502. 
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2) Diamond also refers to the agricultural circumstances which allow the 
“diffusion and migration” of innovation. The Eurasian regions benefit-
ted from their east-west orientation, which allowed such exchange. With 
its east-west axis, it is not divided by impassable seas or mountains (ob-
stacles for the exchange of plants, animals, and technical innovation). 
Moreover, useful plants (such as the pea) and domestic animals (such as 
the chicken) could flourish in all areas of this region because, by virtue 
of its east-west orientation, it presents much the same climate within its 
latitudinal boundaries. This not the case for North America, for example, 
because of its north-south orientation.40 
3) The relative propinquity or isolation of continents from each other is 
another significant factor according to Diamond. Relatively isolated con-
tinents, such as America, did not profit from the innovations of societies 
on other continents, whereas Africa’s relative proximity to Eurasia al-
lowed Africans some contact with some Eurasian invention. 
4) The size of habitable area and population are also important. A higher 
population is an advantage: the more people, thus the more creative 
people – and the more ideas and innovations. China, for example, has 
had more human resources than New Guinea by virtue of its large popu-
lation. It is, however, an advantage if the geographical circumstances al-
low for a number of rivalling and competing societies within a limited 
space. Diamond sees this as one of the main reasons for the swift politi-
cal rise of Europe (and for the decline of the technically more developed 
China). Fragmentation into several small states (in Europe facilitated by 
a geography featuring many islands, peninsulas, seas, and mountains) 
creates, according to Diamond, high innovation pressure. Societies had 
to choose between decline, innovation, or the rapid acquisition of the 
innovations of other cultures (in, for example, the field of weaponry).41 
In sum, Diamond focuses on the natural in human history, and seeks to 
shed light on causal interrelations.42 His book has been accused of defend-
ing a kind of determinism. He refutes this by pointing out that human crea-
tivity is also a condition of development. But he looks upon individual 
                                                 
40 Diamond 1997, 208-230. 
41 Diamond 1997, 503. 
42 Diamond 1997, 506. 
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achievements with the eyes of a natural scientist. Why were there so many 
technological developments in Europe when time seemed to have stopped 
in Tasmania? For Diamond, the difference lies not in any special talents Eu-
ropeans may have, but rather in the difference of environmental and cultur-
al conditions.43 
But why is Diamond’s history of the natural sciences interesting for po-
litical philosophy? It is because of the possibility of applying his reconstruc-
tion of development to contemporary societies in such a way that we might 
not only predict their future, but perhaps also be able to direct and influence 
that future. Diamond himself explores this in his Collapse: How Societies 
Choose to Fail or Succeed (2005) in which he analyses the conditions for the 
decline of cultures. In addition to social factors (such as warfare), Diamond 
identifies some natural circumstances which have contemporary relevance, 
notably the lack of resources caused by unsustainable methods of dealing 
with the environment and natural commodities. One need only consider the 
clearing of whole regions of forest in North Africa, which has destroyed the 
livelihoods of the population. Diamond accords due respect to human be-
ings and their freedom by claiming that these environmental changes are 
not inescapable facts of history. Some of these circumstances are caused by 
human short-sightedness. Some circumstances are natural events to which 
humans beings did not react appropriately in good time. He concludes that 
it is the attitude and flexibility of cultures which determines whether or not 
natural circumstances lead to decline (as the work’s subtitle implies). Cul-
tures must be prepared to modify their behaviours and values if they are to 
react successfully to existential threats in a changing environment. Other-
wise, they will be negatively selected. 
 
 
2.5 The Darwinian Evolution of Cultures 
 
Is it merely a metaphor to speak of the “natural selection” and “evo-
lution” of cultures or of elements of a culture, such as institutions? Not 
                                                 
43 This reinforces the objection of determinism since Diamond stresses over and over that 
natural factors are the “deeper causes” for the critical empiric line of thought in the Greek-
Jewish-Christian tradition which finally lead to the rise of Europe. Cf. Diamond 1997, 507. 
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necessarily, since Darwin’s explanation for the development of species 
can theoretically be applied in many fields. With its concepts of varia-
tion, inheritance, and selection, Darwin’s theory can explain the devel-
opment of very different phenomena. It appears to be necessary that rep-
licating entities which are all dependent on limited resources compete 
with each other. Also it appears to be necessary that the passing on of 
properties is relevant to the survival of any such entity.44 Thus evolution 
can take place even where the replicating units are not DNA helices so 
long as the relevant characteristics of a competition exist. Darwin him-
self attempted to explain the development of language using the concept 
selection. More recently we have seen evolutionary models for the devel-
opment of creative thought and cultural traditions (D. Campbell), for the 
development of scientific theories (S. Toulmin), the distribution of com-
puter viruses via the internet (S. Blackmore), and for the way our im-
mune system works (C. Plotkin).45 In all these cases, analysis in terms of 
replicating entities competing for resources proves fruitful. The entity 
which prevails in the long run is the one which exhibits the most useful 
properties – properties handed down to it by its parent or predecessor 
entity.46 Toulmin, for example, argues that some theories prevail over 
others because of their greater explanatory and integrative power, and 
are thus handed down (replicated) more than less efficient theories 
(which finally vanish). 
Daniel Dennett usefully talks about the “substrate neutrality” of the 
principle of selection.47 If one accepts this idea it makes sense to ask to 
what extent cultures and institutions exhibit Darwinian selection pro-
cesses — independently of the question regarding their biological roots 
or the consequences for the biological fitness of human beings. Very 
much in this sense, already Darwin’s contemporary Herbert Spencer 
(1820-1903) distinguished three stages of the evolutionary process: an 
                                                 
44 See Christian Illies 2005. In this paper I try to give reasons why this insight is necessary. 
45 Campbell 1960; Toulmin 1972; Blackmore 1999, 55 f.; Plotkin 1993. 
46 There are also borderline cases in which a property is selected without being “inherita-
ble.” But this does not lead to evolution. If the “better fitting” properties are re-acquired in 
the new generation, there is only the same selection process taking place in every genera-
tion. 
47 Dennett 1996, 82, 353, 398, 430. 
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“inorganic” evolution of space and earth, an “organic” evolution of living 
creatures, and finally a “superorganic” evolution which includes the de-
velopment of social structures including moral frameworks. (Arnold 
Gehlen simply ignored this possibility, and Walter Burkert did not ana-
lyse it in any depth — despite the fact that it has prima facie plausibility 
and had been mooted since the 19th century).48 
Let us consider a recent example: the theory of the development of 
institutions by Friedrich August von Hayek (1899-1992). Hayek sees in-
stitutions and other cultural artefacts as existing in evolutionary compe-
tition. He assumes that human beings need rules and, therefore, always 
follow them.49 But human reason is too limited to do justice to the com-
plexity of action, especially because an individual cannot well estimate 
the consequences of her actions (and inactions). Rules are helpful, ac-
cording to Hayek, to overcome this constitutional lack of knowledge. 
They reduce complexity and limit the logical space of all related circum-
stances only to the ones which are possibly relevant.50 For Hayek, sys-
tems of rules, and institutions, represent accumulations of historical ex-
periences and the knowledge of a culture. They provide standard solu-
tions for complex decisions and show the individual what she should 
(and could do). Language is the decisive condition for creating, mediat-
ing, and adopting such systems of rules, because only language allows 
us to store such rules and to pass them on to younger generations. This 
process intensified with the advent of written language in later human 
history. Hayek’s concept of the system of rules applies both to the per-
sonal and the social realm of human behaviour: how, for example, to 
plan my own day and how to greet other people. The rules can be more 
formal or less formal. Rules of jurisdiction (laws) are, for example, very 
                                                 
48 Hodgson (2004) discusses the early attempts that apply Darwinism to social phenomena. 
49 von Hayek 1996, 22. A recently often discussed example for an evolutionary theory of 
culture is Dawkins’s memetics. Memetics understand all cultural phenomena (ideas, mel-
odies, pottery, institutions, hallucination etc.) as “memes,” i.e. cultural units that show 
similar behaviour in the “selection chamber” of culture as genes do in the biological room. 
According to memetics, a meme is to be selected because understanding humans pick it 
up and reproduce it — and it fits well into the landscape of memes.(See Blackmore 1999). 
50 von Hayek 1994, 171. This comes pretty close to Gehlen’s and Burkert’s view that insti-
tutions are necessary for orientation. 
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precisely articulated, whereas moral rules (ethical norms) are often ra-
ther informal.  
Regarding the historical development of systems of rules and insti-
tutions, Hayek uses the three Darwinian concepts of variation, inher-
itance, and selection. Variation happens whenever there is an innova-
tion: a new rule or a new course of action which deviates from tradi-
tion. It can be introduced by a creative act, but also by mistake — as, 
for example, when one misinterprets an old rule. After that, selection 
takes place.51 Whether a new rule or convention for social interaction 
within a group will be selected or not depends on how advantageous 
following it might be for the individual. Advantageous rules will be 
adopted, whereas disadvantageous rules will be ignored – and finally 
die out. One might speak of a process of “trial and error.” Thus there 
will be adaptations to the past experience, which are a result of the se-
lective elimination of less appropriate behaviour.52 Hayek seems to as-
sume that selection takes place both within a group and between dif-
ferent groups. In the latter case, an element of biological evolution 
comes into place: groups with less advantageous rules will be also 
physically dominated or eliminated by the other groups. Hayek identi-
fies the mechanism of inheritance as the imitation of rules. Advanta-
geous innovations and useful rules will be followed by others. An im-
portant part of the mechanism of inheritance, according to Hayek, is 
language-acquisition since language assumes a metaphysic of classifi-
cations and relations. In learning a language, one adopts a way of view-
ing, ordering, and acting within the world.53  
According to Hayek, knowledge is accumulated during a long evolu-
tionary process in institutions, (i.e. cultural traditions and habits) but 
also in language and artefacts. The individual uses this corporate 
knowledge by following the institutions, by learning a language, or by 
using a tool. Even if she is not aware of it, she cumulatively incorporates 
experience.54 Understood in this way, cultural evolution is a process of 
social learning, in which the knowledge of whole generations is collected 
                                                 
51 von Hayek 1994, 157 f. 
52 von Hayek 1991, 34. 
53 von Hayek 1973. 
54 von Hayek 1960, 43. 
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and passed on to provide efficient solutions to problems experienced. All 
in all, Hayek sees this process as something positive. The invisible hand 
of selection leads to an accumulation of useful experiences – if this evo-
lution is not interfered with. State-directed economies and un-free socie-
ties experience negative consequences from interference since positive 
development is grounded in the freedom and unpredictability of human 
actions.55 Consciously chosen rules can never produce the same wealth 
of knowledge and experience that unconscious processes of develop-
ment bring about. Von Hayek therefore rejects wide-scale changes of so-
cial institutions but grants that small reforms may be beneficial to indi-
vidual members of society. 
But is this inconsistent with a Darwinian analysis of institutions, 
wherein the institutions are seen to develop by a purely mechanical se-
lection process? No. It is not a Darwinian tenet that the cause of varia-
tion is blind – only that selection is. So it is plausible to assume that 
there will be competition between different institutions – Independently 
of their origin – and the result of this competition is solely decided by 
the criterion of efficiency. Only efficiency determines which institutions, 
and with which properties, will last permanently and which will vanish, 
and when.56 Consciously chosen rules have no advantage over uncon-
sciously evolved rules in the remorseless selection process. For Hayek, 
there is nothing to indicate that consciously chosen rules have any ad-
vantage over others. Conscious interventions are one way of producing 
variation, but there are many others. A theory of the development of in-
stitutions which includes only those rules which have been consciously 
stipulated by human beings remains deficient. According to von Hayek, 
only with the analytical tools of Darwinism can the long-term develop-
ment of institutions be fully explained.57 
                                                 
55 von Hayek 1960, 50. 
56 Similar for the mechanism of inheritance: It was often argued that cultural inheritance 
of institutions were Lamarckian since it allows for the transfer of acquired properties. This 
is plausible, but stands in no contradiction to a Darwinian evolution of institutions since 
also here, variation, (blind) selection and inheritance (however it looks like) remain deci-
sive. Darwin himself is Lamarckian regarding inheritance when he assumes in the the 
Origin of Species that acquired properties can be inherited. 
57 That is the line of argumentation in  Hodgson and Knudsen 2006. 
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There may, however, be cases in which the development of institu-
tions does not follow Darwinian principles. Such is Hayek’s diagnosis of 
state-directed economies mentioned above, but also of totalitarian socie-
ties in which natural selection is precluded by violence. According to 
Hayek, this scenario often leads to bad development, because the posi-
tive natural accumulation of experiences and improvement of institu-
tions has not been allowed to take place. This danger is especially pro-
nounced in a modern technically-advanced world because the state has 
enormous power at its disposal, and may choose not to leave room for 
spontaneity.58 Therefore, Hayek claims, it is a crucial responsibility of 
politics to be aware of this danger. Politics must fashion a framework of 
freedoms for the natural evolution of institutions, so that open evolu-
tionary competition will be possible.59 But this fashioning of the frame-
work of freedom, one might object, could require the conscious stipula-
tion of rules after all.  
 
 
3. Convergence as Objective 
 
3.1 Evolutionary Sciences and the Justification of Normative Judgments 
 
The above approaches have in common that they seek natural expla-
nations for specific social behaviour and cultural phenomena and for 
their development which are relevant to political philosophy (and to the 
political sciences in general). Thus they are helpful in understanding our 
institutions, their history and function. But they cannot contribute to the 
justification of institutions, political ideals, or objectives. This accords 
with Hume’s law: that one cannot get from a descriptive ‘is’ to a pre-
scriptive ‘ought’ without any additional normative arguments.  
As early as 1903 George Edward Moore, in Principia Ethica, extended 
Hume’s law to the evolutionary sciences: there is no direct connection 
between the evolutionary ‘coming to be’ and the normative ‘ought.’ 
Darwinian evolution must be understood as a blind (i.e. not goal-
                                                 
58 See von Hayek 1960, 50. 
59 See von Hayek 1976, 30. 
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oriented) process which does not imply any ideal or any evaluation of its 
outcome. That is also the reason why Moore rejects all evolutionary eth-
ics proposals. (And there is a corollary: It is impossible to use evolution-
ary sciences to argue successfully that all morality is an illusion. For if it 
could be shown by philosophical arguments that there actually are correct 
moral judgments, and one could not deny this by reference to natural 
sciences which are normatively blind.)60 
Of course, it is possible to claim that evolution selects “fitter” entities, 
but “fitter” is a functional description relative to context. A fitter entity 
has properties which grant it a higher reproduction rate under certain 
circumstances, but not the status of being of more value than other enti-
ties. Many parasites and viruses are very fit for their host environment, 
for example, but we do not accord them greater value than other life 
forms: in fact, we evaluate them negatively. “Never use the terms higher 
and lower,” Darwin himself advised, as a kind of warning against over-
laying the descriptive with the normative.61 
Evolutionary explanations are not sufficient for normative judgments 
– at least not if one holds that normative judgments must be justified in 
the strict sense. This is the sense in which rational arguments are neces-
sary to validate normative judgments — and only if they are rationally 
validated, are they valid and obligatory in virtue of a “legitimate legitima-
tion,” as Manfred Wetzel puts it.62 This applies both to ethics and to po-
litical philosophy, if the latter claims to be able to make normative dis-
tinctions between institutions (such as forms of government) or if politi-
cal philosophers formulate objectives for political action. To be sure, it is 
one of the most difficult of philosophical questions what kind of rational 
argument, or even what kind of methodology, would be sufficient for a 
normative justification in this area. But we do not, fortunately, have to 
answer it in this paper. For our purposes here, it is enough to say that 
the methodology of the evolutionary sciences cannot grant a “legitimate 
legitimation.” 
                                                 
60 For a more detailed account, see Illies 2006, 225-235. 
61 Darwin wrote this in the margin of his copy of Vestiges of Creation by Robert Chambers, 
who postulated an evolutionary upward movement. See Di Gregorio 1990, 164 f. 
62 “Kraft einer legitimen [sic] Legitimation als gültig und verbindlich.” See Wetzel 2004, 
209. 
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But why did it – and why does it still – appeal to many authors (such 
as Herbert Spencer, Edward O. Wilson and Richard Dawkins) to analyse 
normative ideals with evolutionary arguments? One reason is the pre-
sent crisis in philosophy regarding the rational justification of moral 
values. No single methodology is commonly accepted. There is another 
reason: the particular interrelated-ness of descriptive and normative 
judgments in biological anthropology. In addition to descriptive state-
ments (statements about human dispositions and evolutionary processes 
of development) and normative judgments (“ought sentences”) there are 
also evolutionary explanations of how human beings arrive at normative 
judgments – descriptive statements about whether and how human be-
ings have dispositions for normative judgments. One obvious example of 
this is what David M. Buss calls “a thirst for justice”.63 Leda Cosmides 
and John Tooby take this as a basis for their claim that we have a genetic 
disposition to think in the category of social contract — that means in 
normative categories. But can this be a justification for the social con-
tract? I would deny this with reference to Hume’s law. It is and always 
will be a descriptive statement to explain the biological causes which lie 
behind the giving of a normative judgment, and a normative judgment 
cannot follow from a descriptive statement. Let us look at an example. In 
1848 there was a rock-blasting accident in which an iron rod was driven 
through the head of the American railroad construction worker named 
Phineas Gage. Much of Gage’s left frontal lobe was destroyed, but he 
somehow (to everyone’s surprise) survived this accident. But Gage was 
no longer the polite gentlemen he was before the accident: he turned 
very negative. Today, neurologists might explain in some detail why 
Gage gave only negative judgments about his fellow men after the acci-
dent happened. But the fact that neurobiologists could explain these 
normative judgements does not mean that they are justified. Explana-
tions are simply not reasons.  
There might be a reason why evolutionary anthropology often con-
fuses descriptive and normative judgments. It seems to follow from our 
biological nature that we ask for a “legitimate legitimation” at all. It is a 
special characteristic of the human being that her complex brain allows 
                                                 
63 Buss 2004, 388. 
The Relevance of Anthropology and the Evolutionary Sciences for Political Philosophy 
 
175 
her to stand at a linguistic distance from herself, and to consider herself 
free to choose between possible objectives, wishes, and the satisfaction 
of various needs. Max Scheler pointed this out in his philosophical an-
thropology when he describes humans as capable of suppressing his 
impulses. While animals must always say ‘yes’ to their needs and desire, 
we are able to say on occasion ‘no’ to our drives and impulses.64 
Standing at this distance, humans ask the universal ‘why’ question: 
we seek explanations for everything that exists, for good reasons for 
what we want to do, and for good reasons for what we ought to do. From 
this human characteristic arises the need for theoretical ordering and for 
practical orientation – two things Gehlen and Burkert identified (in dif-
ferent ways, of course) as the beginning of culture, politics, and religion. 
This human need culminates in the desire for a legitimate legitimation. 
We are not satisfied with easy answers to the problem of justification.  
 
 
3.2 Convergence as the Objective of Political Activity 
 
Political philosophy, if it acknowledges both the possibility of the 
normative and the existence of the inherent laws and processes in the 
world (made known to us by the empirical sciences), must fulfil the task 
of bringing about states of society where what is (normatively) best 
might become real. One part of this task might be the guaranteeing of 
universal human rights by positive law. The task itself may have to be 
spread over time in a somewhat complex way. For example, one might 
distinguish between what is possible at present, what is possible in the 
middle-term, and what is possible long-term (with the added complexity 
that present actions may increase or decrease the range of possible fu-
ture actions). Johann Gottlieb Fichte adopted this methodology of politi-
cal philosophy as the ground for his work Der geschlossene Handelsstaat 
(= the closed trading state). His idea can be easily identified by looking at 
the structure of the work: Fichte beings with the account and justifica-
tion of an ideal (an institution of which he believes he can with good 
reason approve, i.e. the closed trading state). He then describes the reali-
                                                 
64 Scheler 1975, 55. 
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ty of his time: he gives an analysis of actual commercial intercourse. Fi-
nally he gives political recommendations as to how to implement the 
ideal in the real world.65 The implementation, then, is not a task of polit-
ical philosophy, but of actual politics.  
Political philosophy cannot, however, always distinguish between 
these aspects as clearly as Johann Gottlieb Fichte did. It is especially dif-
ficult in practice to define the boundaries between the justification of 
normative judgments on the one hand, and the task of making the nor-
mative actual on the other. Normative ideals are generally part of the 
basic cultural equipment of a historically developed society. Normative 
ideals are used in practice and are not, therefore, a part only of normative 
approaches, but also a part of descriptive approaches (even though these 
latter approaches cannot justify them). Furthermore, discourses of nor-
mative justification are also embedded in culture and can often be un-
derstood only in their proper contexts. Finally, one must distinguish the 
validity of normative ideals from their factual acknowledgement, and 
this in turn must be distinguished from actual compliance with these 
norms. The latter two are both parts of the descriptive world and it is 
therefore difficult (but important) to give a strict definition of them. It 
remains necessary – following Hume’s law – to distinguish the justifica-
tion of normative ideals from the description of ideals people actually 
hold to. 
Not even the subtlest analysis of the world, knowledge of cultural 
contexts and of the realities of the acknowledgement of ideals can lead to 
a legitimate legitimation of normative ideals. But neither can a set of jus-
tified normative values lead to any good in the world. Even a perfect un-
derstanding of our normative ideals does not tell us how to implement 
them in the world: ideals without empirical data are empty; empirical 
data without ideals are blind. 
How are we to understand the relation between the justification of 
ideals and the gathering of empirical knowledge? One usually assumes a 
reflective equilibrium between those two activities. The empirical sci-
                                                 
65 This is equivalent to the “mixed syllogism” already Aristotle used as a basic logical hy-
pothesis of applied ethics. Given a normative a priori premise and a descriptive a posteriori 
premise, one can infer a special normative statement that represents an application of the 
firstly mentioned ideal to the descriptively grasped part of reality. See Hösle 1999, 169. 
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ences can be of use in aiding the implementation of ideals. If we hold, 
for example, that the right to political participation is fundamental, we 
need to analyse a culture to know exactly about what is meant by political 
participation within that culture. Furthermore, motivation for empirical 
research often comes from relevant questions which have arisen from 
normative ideals. The ideal of political participation will, for example, 
focus our attention on possible mechanisms of manipulation; and these 
we must understand if we seek to protect human beings from them-
selves. The reflexive process is subtle. We begin with a rather general 
formalisation of the ideal, and might perhaps have only a limited rele-
vant knowledge of the empirical world. During reflection, we sharpen 
that ideal, but also focus on the relevant aspects of the empirical world 
which will help us implement the ideal. Inspecting the empirical world 
might also lead us to a more in-depth critique of an ideal. If an ideal 
cannot be implemented, one should seriously question its legitimacy. 
Thus the reflective equilibrium between the normative and the descrip-
tive approaches helps us make normative ideals substantial. An im-
portant consequence of this equilibrium is a certain dynamic within po-
litical philosophy: Normative judgments have only presumptive validity, 
since they must remain open for revision and challenge by new objec-
tions which might become necessary in face of new empirical insights. 
The constantly varying contexts of a world in change should lead to con-
stantly varying substantialisations of our ideals. But none of this entails 
that the justification of moral norms depends on social or cultural con-
text – contrary to what the contextualists, for example, claim. 
What does it mean to implement normative ideals in the empirical 
world? We cannot work, especially in politics, with so simple a deduc-
tion as tells us only that the normative ideal should be applied or instan-
tiated according to this or that circumstances. (One might imagine such 
a simple process of substantialisation only, perhaps, in the case of pro-
hibitions.) Generally, one would have to focus on long-term processes of 
development of political structures and institutions towards a normative 
ideal. There are a number of reasons for this. Change often can only 
happen in a rather plodding way – via reform and not via revolution. 
Complex institutions, deeply-rooted traditions, and strong attitudes can-
not be reformed quickly. Attempts to do so either fail completely or re-
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sult in immense social costs (remember Gandhi’s attempt to abolish the 
caste system in India). Often slow reform is the more efficient, and 
sometimes the only possible, way. Not everything is possible at every 
point of time. Normative ideals cannot be implemented directly in many 
cases, but only indirectly through changing a certain framework. The 
best way to fight poverty in a region could be, for example, the creation 
of a better education system. This is something we can learn from the 
evolutionary sciences: processes of development have their own logic. A 
prudent political philosophy will accept this, but will also try to use this 
inherent logic to nudge evolution into the right direction.  
With other words, political philosophy is about the “convergence” of 
social developments and normative ideals. The normative ideal should, 
in the long term, become a naturally practiced ethical life within a cul-
ture. Only thus can the normative ideal become substantive in a perma-
nent and stable way. It is the enduring insight of Hegel that morality be-
comes concrete only in the actual practice of the ethical life. We might 
add that such an ethical life must be arrived at by evolutionary processes 
and must have proved itself through the process of selection. Conver-
gence is not only a first-order objective, but also a higher-order ideal, an 
ideal ideal, as we might say, since it is the ideal way for ideals to become 
reality.  
 
 
3.3 The Natural Conditions of Convergence 
 
All actions, including political actions, take place within contextual 
frameworks of conditions. Without frameworks, there would be no op-
tions, and actions could neither be limited nor promoted. Political phi-
losophy seeks to analyse and utilise these conditions. It is not, a priori, 
possible to reach impossibilities, and not therefore useful to aspire to the 
impossible. Therefore, political philosophy must strive for the best with-
in a framework of limited possibilities. This might be achieved by chang-
ing the conditions, but if the conditions are immutable, one must 
choose or design institutions or actions which fit into the framework of 
immutable conditions and lead to optimal results, or at least to the best 
possible ones.  
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But what consequences can we draw for political philosophy from 
the diverse natural conditions which determine our actions? By natural 
conditions I mean to include those created by both nature within our-
selves and nature around us, and also the inherent logic of evolutionary 
development. If the examples of cultural explanation in Section 2 are 
sound, political philosophy could improve our society the better with 
them than without them. We will differentiate four different aspects of 
this conditional framework which have been handed over to political 
philosophy by anthropology and the evolutionary sciences. Even though 
the distinctions are not sharp, the differentiation will prove useful. 
 
(i) There are fundamental conditions, as we can learn from Dia-
mond. Ignoring them makes success impossible. Cultures should not, 
for example, be wasteful with their natural resources since they cannot 
survive without them. It is obviously not reasonable to expect human be-
ings to act in a way which is impossible for them, and we do not need 
any specialised sciences to tell us what is impossible for us.  
More interesting are the areas where we could learn from anthropol-
ogy what is almost impossible for us – areas where our genetically-
disposed actions and emotions make things difficult for us. One exam-
ple is our desire for social rank and respect of fellows. A society without 
social rank is not only hard to justify, but also unachievable. Attempts to 
achieve it, from the French Revolution to Communist experiments, have 
all failed and led to new ranking systems instead.  
But if one desires do deal wisely with what is almost impossible, one 
should still be critical towards what is alleged as impossible. One should dis-
tinguish between a disposition and its development and manifestation. In 
most cases, certain actions are impossible for human beings because their 
dispositions developed in a certain way, not because their dispositions pre-
clude such actions in principle. One example is antagonistic behaviour. 
Whether it is possible for a human being to solve conflicts without aggres-
sion depends significantly on whether she experienced peaceful conflict so-
lutions in her adolescence — and whether she is in general familiar with 
such peaceful solutions. To understand the convergence of human action 
with normative ideals, one must understand the human being as a creature 
of possibilities. And one way of doing that is to focus on moral education. 
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(ii) Human beings have a natural constitution. This cannot be ig-
nored. But more than that: one should make use of one’s natural consti-
tution in order to reach normative objectives. If institutions make use of 
this constitution to steer impulses to act in a certain direction, they can 
implement ideals without using force. If it were possible to connect so-
cial ranks in a society to the achievement of politically desirable virtues, 
there would be a competition between citizens over their contribution to 
the common good. This is something Plato and Aristotle had in mind, 
and is certainly welcome from the perspective of modern political phi-
losophy and practice.  
Liberalism in the 18th century had similar ideas. For the develop-
ment of a liberal community one does not need a new kind of human 
being; rather all the shortcomings and weaknesses of human beings as 
they are could be useful in the attainment of this goal. This is what Kant 
had in mind when he called human beings the “crooked wood.” But be-
ing an optimist, Kant acts on the assumption that even evil (for example 
avaricious and egoistic) motives could have positive consequences. For 
Kant, nature is designed to make harmony spring from human discord, 
even against the will of man.66 Competition is enough to erect the high 
house of a harmonic society by making use of the human weaknesses. 
Contemporary political philosophy does not necessarily share Kant’s op-
timism (that also influenced Hayek). But the main point still pertains: it 
should be on the political agenda that we use everything which moti-
vates human beings to implement normative ideals, even our unsocial 
instincts. We should, therefore, also give prima facie unsocial motiva-
tions and dispositions a chance of expression in case they turn out to be 
useful in the long run. 
Anthropology can contribute to this by showing us which disposi-
tions need to be controlled, and evolutionary sciences can show what in-
herent logic we have to deal with if we want to control them. Under-
standing this inherent logic does not entail trusting in a self-developing 
selection process which will reach a desirable outcome steered by an 
“invisible hand.” The bottom-line of evolutionary theory is that evolution 
is not goal-oriented. But evolution is compatible with the stipulation of 
                                                 
66 Kant 1776, 143. 
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goals,67 as Darwin made clear with reference to the breeding of domestic 
animals and useful plants (at beginning of his Origin of Species). If selec-
tion is goal-oriented, by, for example, the breeding program of a cultiva-
tor, it may lead to the desired result.  
But now there are two conditions one has to consider if one wishes 
give a direction to an evolutionary process. These are the last two aspects 
of the conditional framework for political philosophy which one can in-
fer from anthropology and the evolutionary sciences. Let us consider 
them. 
 
(iii) In an evolutionary process, after many generations, a property 
(or an entity having a property) will prevail over its competitors, only if 
that property or that entity is better fitted than its competitors for the 
conditions in which selection takes place. “Prevailing” means to have 
more descendants in future generations than one’s competitors. This 
also applies to cases of non-biological entities which are in an evolution-
ary competition. It is important for the evolutionary success of an entity 
to have advantages over its competitors. 
How can we use this insight in a prudent way in order to control po-
litical developments? Well, we must design institutions that accord with 
the normative ideal in such a way that they could prevail over competing 
institutions. To use an expression of game theory: Institutions have to be 
“evolutionary stable strategies.” That means that a strategy (behavioural 
rules, institutions, etc.) must be more useful for the relevant actors than 
any other potential strategy. We should, for example, ask how to design 
democracy in such a way that it is evolutionary stable within our society 
and cannot be annulled by extremist tendencies. To reach such a goal, 
prohibiting extremist parties and forbidding the self-disempowerment of 
the democratic parliament are wise means.  
 
(iv)The conditions of selection itself must also be given attention. 
What property or entity prevails in the long run depends both on the rel-
evant property or entities and on the selective circumstances. To reach 
convergence, one should therefore modify the conditions of selection in 
                                                 
67 See Illies 2006, 81-90. 
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accordance with the objective. Robert Axelrod, for example, argues that 
children have to be educated in small groups since only in those condi-
tions can a reciprocal altruism develop. (It is in these conditions that al-
truism becomes the prevalent strategy, and children can then develop 
the habit of cooperation). Any society needs, in order to survive, a deeply 
rooted altruism tying its members together. In contrast, schools without 
stable classes provide unfavourable selection conditions for altruistic 
strategies. Prudent politics should therefore avoid them as much as pos-
sible, and promote instead small, stable classes.  
In this way, political philosophy can make a productive use of empir-
ical data coming from anthropology and biological sciences: Politicians 
must analyse in a very concrete fashion, for each kind of circumstances, 
what behaviour and what institutions are generated by and compatible 
with given environmental conditions and political constellations. Such 
an analysis will heavily rely on considerations concerning what behav-
iours and what institutions were selected in the past. Even if we are only 
at the beginning of our attempt to understand the complex interrelation 
between nature (and its evolution) and cultural phenomena, such inves-
tigations promise to offer new insights into our practical problems. Po-
litical philosophy has to integrate the insights of anthropology and evolu-
tionary sciences in an increasingly creative and constructive way, in or-
der to pursue the goal of convergence between ideal and reality.68 
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